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ABSTRACT: What roles do “winning” and “losing” have to play in argumentative discussions? We say
that someone has “won” a discussion or debate, but also an emphasis on “winning” is often rejected. The
question is: can these concepts be so interpreted that justice is done to these antagonistic views? Starting
from Aristotelian ideas, the paper purports to establish that the views mentioned above can indeed be
reconciled.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When discussing argumentation, the terms ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ quite often make their
appearance. This holds both for argumentative practice (real life debates and
argumentative discussions) and for theory (normative models of argumentative
discussions). In practice––as no one will be surprised to hear––these predicates are not
always used in the same way, it being a moot question which role they ought to play. For
instance, suppose you read a headline announcing that Obama won a certain election
debate. You may then wonder what, exactly, is meant by ‘winning’ and whether this
attribution is justified. As to theory: in some normative models there is a larger or smaller
role for winning and losing, but there are also theoretical discussions in which this role is
dismissed, at least for the best kinds of argumentation. The question is: can the concepts
of winning and losing be given a precise content in a way such that justice is done to
these antagonistic views about their role in argumentation?
To gain a clear understanding of this matter we shall first have a closer look at the
ordinary sense of the terms ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ and especially at their sense in
connection with debate and discussion (Section 2). Next we shall consider some points of
view about ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ that occur within the theory of argumentation. These
points of view may be either dismissive (Section 3) or rather more positive (Section 4) as
in the cases of ancient dialectic as presented by Aristotle (1976) in Topics 8 (Section 4.1),
of formal dialectic (Section 4.2), and of pragma-dialectics (Section 4.3). At the end the
results will be summarized (Section 5).
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2. THE CONCEPTS OF WINNING AND LOSING
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1989) lists three principal senses (or groups
of senses) for ‘win’ as a verb:
1 […] be victorious in (a battle, contest, race, etc); do best […]
2 […] obtain or achieve sth as the result of a bet, competition, race, etc […]
3 (a) […] obtain or reach (sth), esp. as a result of hard work or perseverance […] (b) […] cause
(sb) to obtain or achieve sth […]

At present, we are mainly concerned with sense 1 (to be victorious). But we should keep
in mind that ‘winning’ can also refer to obtaining some benefits (senses 2 and 3). We
shall refer to the first sense as the victory sense of ‘winning,’ and to the other two as the
benefit sense. A glance at the entry for ‘lose’ gives us, besides a number of other senses,
the opposites of these senses of ‘winning’:
6 (a) […] be defeated; fail to win (a contest, a lawsuit, an argument, etc) […] [relates to the victory
sense of ‘winning’] (b) […] have sth taken away (by sth/sb) ‹ [relates to the benefit sense]

So we may focus on ‘winning,’ in particular on ‘winning’ in the victory sense. In
definition 1 winning is defined in terms of ‘victorious.’ Further investigation using the
dictionary does not seem to yield much: victorious is defined as ‘having gained a victory;
triumphant’; here, gaining is defined as winning (in sense 2, the benefit sense), which is
again defined in terms of achieving, whereas a victory is defined as a ‘success in a war,
contest, game, etc’; a success is defined as an ‘achievement of an desired end ...’; an
achievement is defined as an ‘action of achieving’; so it all turns on the definition of
‘achieving,’ but achieving brings us back again to gaining. Inevitably, we are getting into
circles Yet, consulting the dictionary is useful, for one thing because the investigation of
the different senses of ‘winning’ shows us that the victory sense of ‘winning’ involves the
benefit sense. Altogether, the following characteristics of the victory sense can be
gleaned from the dictionary:
1. Winning occurs in a context of struggle (S), or at least competition.
2. Hence, there must be an adversary (‘other party’) (A).
3. Winning refers to the result or outcome of the struggle.
4. The outcome is positive for the winner (W) and negative for the adversary.
5. There is something at stake: a benefit (B) obtained by the winner.
In general, a situation of winning can be described by substituting appropriate terms for
the variables in the sentence form:
W defeats A in S and thus obtains B.
Here W stands for the winner (or the winning party), A for the adversary, S for a
struggle of some kind, whereas B stands for what is at stake in the struggle (the
benefit). Examples are obtained by substituting various competitive activities for
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S, which activities often go with special terms for denoting the adversary or the
benefit (Table 1).
Struggle
war
lawsuit
match
game of chance
bet
lottery
debate
discussion

Adversary
enemy
prosecution/defence
rival
antagonist
bookie
competitor
opponent
interlocutor/opponent

Benefit
territory/raw materials/empire
acquittal/conviction
medal/championship
the pool
the stakes
prize
acknowledged superiority
being judged right

/
Table 1: Activities involving winning and losing
Now, one may wonder whether reference to ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ in the cases of debates
and discussions is as customary as in the other cases of competitive activities. Could such
reference in the cases of debates and discussions not rather rest on a forced comparison
with a match or even a war? For debates, however, one may point out that it is not really
unusual to speak of ‘winning’ and ‘losing’; but, then, if one refers to a debate, what does
one mean by these terms?
After a Dutch election debate on November 3rd, 2006, between Jan Peter
Balkenende (Prime Minister and leader of the Christian Democratic Party) and Wouter
Bos (leader of the oppositional Social Democratic Party), one broadcasting company
brought the news on the internet with the headline: “Bos beats Balkenende in debate”
(NOS Nieuws 2006). 1 Another broadcasting company displayed the headline: “Viewers:
Bos beats Balkenende in debate” (RTLnieuws 2006). In both cases one should read more
in order to grasp the meaning of ‘beating,’ which does correspond to the victory sense of
‘winning.’ In the first case, we get the most detailed explanation:
According to 50 percent of the viewers, Mr Bos, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, is the
winner of the telecast debate on RTL4, 46 percent thought that his rival, Mr Balkenende (Christian
Democratic Party), better came into his own. This is shown by a poll carried out by TNS/Nipo
canvassing 1342 people.
Bos got a 7.2 and Balkenende a 6.9. 2 Among people that before the debate were intending to vote
for the Socialist Party, now 19 percent declares to go for the Social Democratic Party.

The other company adds that the sample interviewed in the poll was a representative one
and that ‘exactly 50 percent of the viewers think that Mr. Bos was the better one in
selling his arguments.’

1

Dutch texts from the internet have all been translated by the present author.
These marks are given on a scale with 1 as a the worst and 10 as the best score, where every mark below
5.5 equals an F, 6 equals a C minus, and every mark above 8 stands for a kind of A. So, roughly, Bos had a
B minus and Balkenende a C plus .
2
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The definition of ‘winning’ applied in such polls seems to imply that you are the
winner of a debate as soon as more canvassed people declare you to be the winner than
there are canvassed people for any of the other debaters. But this threatens to boil down
to the stipulation that you are the winner as soon as people think you are the winner, and
hence as soon as people think that people think you are the winner, and hence as soon as
people think that people think that people think you are the winner, and so on. To escape
from this regress, we must assume that the canvassed people understand ‘winning’ in a
sense different than that adopted by the canvassers. The latter may think and declare that
someone has won if he has the greatest number on his side. But the people canvassed may
be supposed to wield different criteria. The question is what the viewers’ criteria amount
to.
Notably, it does not seem to be a matter of whether the viewers think that Mr Bos,
with respect to certain issues, put forward the best arguments, or maybe even must be
judged right. Obviously, the concern here is not primarily to evaluate the discussions,
which are implicit in the debate, between either debater and the viewers. Rather, what is
at issue is the rhetorical evaluation of each debater’s performance, though this may
involve also the quality of the arguments.
But, granted that winning a debate is a matter of rhetorical evaluation, even so we
do not yet dispose of a definite concept of ‘winning a debate.’ After all, different
companies and juries may evaluate the same debate, each of them using somewhat
different criteria and thus reaching diverging conclusions. Thus, FOK!frontpage (2006,
“Bos wins debate narrowly”) notes that the Balkenende–Bos debate was also judged by a
jury in the studio. This jury “had declared Balkenende the winner because he, globally,
made a more confident impression. Bos seemed to be stressed, but according to Henkjan
Smits––a body language expert––he had ‘his moments.’ But then, Bos frequently
interrupted the leader of the Christian Democratic Party and would be a ‘control freak’.”
We must conclude that in ordinary language there is no unambiguous notion of
winning a debate. Rather, such a verdict will always be relative to a specific group of
evaluators. In this ‘winning a debate’ differs from winning a lawsuit or a match.
How about winning a discussion? The expression ‘winning the discussion’ is
rather less common than ‘winning the debate.’ Users of language differ about whether the
concepts of winning and losing apply to discussions. This is shown by the following
discussion (“discushion 3 and linguistic blunders”) on forum.fok.nl (2005):
Appelboom (11/24, 2005, 9:15 pm): Hi,
It must be familiar, a substantial discussion. Heavily winning […] and all at once you say for
instance “onliest” or “as” instead of “than.”
I once read an article that expounded some research that someone who in discussion corects3 the
other on a technical point of language has lost the discussion by definition. [...]
thabit (11/24, 2005, 9:20 pm): That doesn’t seem to make sense. Rather one who commits
linguistic blunders shows himself to be incapable of formulating his arguments well and therefore
has lost the discussion by definition.
Gajus (11/26, 2005, 4:02 am): Winning or losing a discussion? As if there is any meaningful
analogy with a contest.

3

Linguistic blunders in the Dutch are translated into similar blunders.
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Surely, two people are opposed to each other, both exchange arguments, but to claim that the
arguments of one are “better” than those of the other and that, therefore, the first has defeated the
other […] ? Would there be a criterion to quantify arguments?
A good discussion results in an improvement of knowledge for all concerned. In that sense, there
are just ‘winners.’
Automatic Rock (11/26, 2005, 9:07 am): That’s for sure. But if you can convince the other, than
you may for my part say to have won the discussion.

This example exhibits three views on argumentative discussion: Both Appelboom and
thabit see discussion as a competitive activity to which the concepts of ‘winning’ and
‘losing’ do apply (even though they disagree about the role of linguistic blunders); Gajus
holds that these concepts do not apply and sees discussion as an activity in which both
participants exchange arguments and cooperate to improve their knowledge; Automatic
Rock adopts a middle course.
3. WINNING AND LOSING: CONTRA
The point of view exemplified by Gajus, who is opposed to a role for winning and losing
in argumentative discussions, is sometimes presented as urging that good discussions
yield a win-win situation. Upon hearing the term win-win situation some people,
however, raise their eyebrows. That may be because the term conflicts with the core of
the victory sense of winning, according to which winning by one implies losing by the
other. Clearly, the word ‘win’ should in this case be understood to have the benefit sense:
both parties obtain or achieve some advantage. But then the opposition between a winwin situation and a win-loss situation vanishes because in the latter term the word ‘win’
does have the victory sense. Consequently, a situation can very well be both a win-win
situation and a win-loss situation.
In argumentation theory and informal logic, similar points of view as those put
forward by Gajus and his interlocutors are expressed by distinguishing various kinds of
arguing with a predilection for one of them. Thus Michael Gilbert, in his How to Win an
Argument, distinguishes ‘creative argument’ from ‘attached argument’ with a clear
preference for the former:
An argument is creative when the arguers are willing to explore a position in order to determine its
value, when you and your partner are willing to alter or reconsider a position if strong arguments
are brought against it. An attached argument is just the opposite: You and your partner have a
strong commitment to a position, an emotional or psychological stake in seeing one conclusion
triumph. [...] In a creative argument both parties are more interested in finding the truth or solving
the problem than in being right. (Gilbert 1995, p. 12)

According to Gilbert “No one really loses a creative argument” (1995, p. 24); at first
sight, a surprising statement in a book entitled How to Win an Argument: how is one to
win an argumentative discussion if no one ever loses? Or can only attached arguments be
won? Light may be cast on the matter if we take into account the different senses of
‘winning’ (and the corresponding ‘losing’). Gilbert writes:
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In a creative argument, neither position is a clear victor. Yet the investigation, the examination of
the issues and problems, provides insights and information about the position. In a creative
encounter you always come out ahead—one very important kind of winning. (Gilbert 1995, p. 24)

It seems that, actually one could win a creative argument (in the victory sense) making
the other lose––be it not as a “clear victor”––, but more important is that both parties win
in the sense that they obtain a benefit from the discussion. In the benefit sense of
‘winning’ and ‘losing’ there are no losers in a creative argument. How to Win an
Argument is a practically-oriented book; in his later more theoretical work Coalescent
Argumentation, Gilbert writes:
Classically and usually, the aim of an argument has been to bring an opposer around to the point of
view the proponent is defending. When the opponent abandons his point of view and accepts the
proponent’s claim into his commitment set, then the argument has been won by the proponent.
This kind of winning does not occur frequently. More often outcomes include a negotiated
agreement, a compromise, or a realization that further dispute is futile. In pragma-dialectic terms,
sometimes opposers “settle,” as opposed to “resolve,” a dispute. (Gilbert 1997, p. 103)

Gilbert does not deny that the notion of winning makes sense when applied to
argumentative discussion, but refrains from giving it prominence. His position resembles
in this respect that of Automatic Rock in the example given above.
An even more forceful rejection of the idea that winning and losing deserve a
prominent position in the theory of argumentation can be found in Cooperative
Argumentation by Josina Makau and Debian Marty, who champion cooperative
argumentation against competitive argumentation:
The approach to disagreement developed in this book is a process of reasoned interaction intended
to help participants and audiences make the best assessments or the best decisions in any given
situation. (Makau and Marty 2001, p. 87)

Makau and Marty assess the role of winning negatively:
[…] ideological commitments to competitiveness, individualism, and winning also compromise
cooperative argumentation and interdependent decision making. We have had little difficulty
seeing how, when participants are motivated primarily by the desire to win or to further only their
own immediate self interests, realization of a deliberative community is nearly impossible. (Makau
and Marty 2001, p. 101).

In the next section, we shall see that among dialecticians there is a more positive attitude
towards winning and losing.
4. WINNING AND LOSING: PRO
In this section we shall investigate the role of winning and losing in some kinds of
dialectic. After having discussed Aristotle, we shall move on to discuss contemporary
formal dialectic, and finally pragma-dialectics from this angle. 4
4

The subject of this section will be treated somewhat more extensively in Krabbe (2009?).
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4.1 Aristotle in Topics 8
In the eighth book of the Topics Aristotle discusses dialectical procedure. The book is
somewhat puzzling, as the text seems continually to shift between cooperation-oriented
and competition-oriented conceptions of discussion. A great difficulty for the
contemporary reader is that Aristotle discusses a practice of discussion that he supposes
to be familiar to his audience, whereas in our times we do not meet with discussions of
that kind in daily life. Though Aristotle nowhere gives us a list of rules of discussion, the
essentials of the procedure have been reconstructed. There are two roles: that of the
Questioner and that of the Answerer. The Questioner proposes a problem for discussion
(e.g., “Is virtue teachable, or not?”); de Answerer selects a thesis (an answer to the
problem). The contradictory of his thesis is sometimes called “the Questioner’s thesis”; it
is the conclusion the Questioner is to deduce. In order to do so, the Questioner asks the
Answerer to grant certain premises. It is not upon the Answerer to argue for his thesis;
only the Questioner is to defend his thesis by argument. In case the Questioner succeeds
to do so, the Answerer has been refuted. Let this (oversimplified 5 ) sketch of the
procedure suffice.
On the face of it, competition seems prominent in this kind of discussion. The role
of winning and losing is notable in this context. When the Answerer is refuted, one may
say that he has lost and that the Questioner has won; when the Questioner does not
succeed to accomplish a refutation, it will be the other way round. This impression gets
confirmation from Aristotle’s discussion of concealment (krupsis), i.e. tactics for
“concealing the conclusion” that can be deployed to keep the Answerer ignorant about
the way the Questioner intends to go about reaching his conclusion. Such tactics would
be inappropriate if cooperation were the whole story. However, according to Aristotle,
though techniques for concealing the conclusion serve contentious (eristic, competitive)
goals, all the same these should be used because in argumentative discussion one is
always addressing the other. (Topics 8.1, 155b26-28). Examples of such tactics are:
asking alternately for premises belonging to different parts of the argument to be
constructed in order to avoid that premises one wants to link will at an early stage reveal
their conclusion; raising, once in a while, objections against oneself to quench suspicion;
prolonging one’s argument and inserting irrelevant points.
Notwithstanding these contentious features, Aristotle’s first concern remains a
cooperation-oriented kind of discussion that serves the goals of exercise, of examining
one’s interlocutor (peirastic), and of inquiry (Topics 8.5, 159a25-28). Cooperation is
pursued to such an extent that the Answerer is even required to contribute to the
construction of a good argument, and thus to his own refutation, if such refutation by
good argument is feasible. A good argument, according to Aristotle, starts from premises
that are more acceptable and more familiar than its conclusion. Marta Wlodarczyk (2000,
p. 156) has dubbed this principle the Overarching Principle (OP). A good Questioner
should, therefore, ask the Answerer to grant premises that are more acceptable and more
5

The sketch leaves out induction, analogies, preliminary deductions, and objections.
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familiar that the conclusion he is to deduce from them. But, according to the rules in
Topics 8.5, not only the Questioner, but also the Answerer, is to guard the quality of the
argument in this respect: if the Questioner were to ask for a premise that does not fulfill
the requirements of the OP, the Answerer should not concede it. On the other hand, the
Answerer should concede premises that fulfill these requirements. According to Aristotle,
Questioner and Answerer have a common task (koinon ergon).
This is not to say that cooperation between the two parties is always perfect. The
Answerer can display obstructive (‘peevish’) behaviour and refuse to concede necessary
premises (Topics 8.11, 161a17-24). The Questioner, too, may misbehave by questioning
his interlocutor in a contentious manner (Topics 8.11, 161a37-161b5). In such cases,
there should be a way to resist one’s opponent by an equally contentious reaction, so that
ultimately competitiveness and winning and losing appear to be indispensable ingredients
of this type of discussion.
Besides this type of dialectic (dialectic discussions in the narrow sense), which is
primarily cooperation-oriented but includes contentious elements, Aristotle recognizes
two other types of dialectic: the contentious (eristic) discussion, which really is all about
winning and losing, and the didactic (demonstrative) discussion, in which winning and
losing may have no role to play. In dialectic discussions in the narrow sense, contentious
means are supposedly deployed, ultimately, to further the execution of the common task.
This holds as well for winning and losing themselves. 6 As Wlodarczyk writes:
It seems […] that the desire to win, as long as it is subordinated to the desire to accomplish the
common task, would not hinder good dialectic. Moreover, assuming the dialecticians pursue the
common task, the desire to win could be seen as a stimulus for pursuing it better than the opponent
and hence for achieving the best argument for a given conclusion. (Wlodarczyk 2000, p. 170, note
41)

4.2. Formal dialectic
The term “formal dialectic” was introduced by Charles Hamblin (1970), but the first
formal dialectic systems were authored by Paul Lorenzen (starting, in 1958, with the
lecture Logik und Agon, published in 1960). These systems belong to formal logic, but
start from a dialectical situation, instead of being presented in a semantic or inferential
framework. There are two roles: that of the Proponent and that of the Opponent, which
roles roughly correspond with those of Questioner and Answerer, respectively, in ancient
dialectic. The Proponent has a thesis to defend; the Opponent attacks this thesis (she
challenges the Proponent), but has herself no thesis to defend. Usually, however, the
Opponent puts forward a number of concessions––either at the start of the discussion or
in reply to questioning by the Proponent; these may be used by the Proponent to defend
his thesis. Dialogical logic systems (dialogue games) are defined by stipulating rules that
precisely determine the options for either participant. On the basis of such systems, one
may provide dialectical definitions for the concept of validity in terms of winning
strategies, hence ultimately in terms of winning and losing. Since these dialogue games
are based on a situation with two parties, a difference of opinion, and rules of discussion
6
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Ch. 14).
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that should, ideally, lead to a resolution, Lorenzen thus contributed to bridging the gap
between logic and theory of argumentation.
It may be clear that winning and losing are essential for dialogue logic; but
without giving these games a contentious character. In fact, both participants do also have
the common task to resolve their difference of opinion and are for that reason bound to
the rules of the game. The same holds for the further argumentation-theoretic elaboration
and justification of the rules of dialogue logic attempted, about thirty years ago, by Else
Barth and the present author (Barth and Krabbe 1982, Ch. 3 and 4). That there should be
opportunities for winning and losing was evident to us:
Why should the debaters enter into a discussion at all? There must be some possible—spiritual, if
not material—immediate results, desired by the debater in question. The following rules answer
this question:
FD W1 If, in a certain chain of arguments [= a chronological sequence of moves, related among
themselves, starting with an attack on the Proponent’s thesis, without any retractions or
replacements of moves by other moves], one party has
(1) lost its rights in that chain of arguments or
(2) exhausted its rights in that chain of arguments, then this party shall express that the
other party has won (with respect to) that chain of arguments by rational means.
FD W2 If and only if one party has won a certain chain of arguments by rational means, then this
party may express that the other party has “lost (with respect to) that chain of arguments”
provided it adds: “My adversary in this discussion has used rational arguments and so
was rational with respect to every stage [= move] of the discussion (in this chain of
arguments).” (Barth and Krabbe 1982, p. 71)

These are rules pertaining to the direct consequences of formally winning or losing a
chain of arguments (there are corresponding rules for winning or losing the discussion as
a whole; a discussion will usually comprise a number of chains of arguments). One may
not be impressed by the benefits of winning or the harms of losing: if you win the other is
to admit that you have won, and you may yourself declare that you have won
(recognizing that your interlocutor’s behaviour in discussion has been rational); if you
lose you must admit to have lost and your opponent is entitled to declare to have won
(recognizing that your behaviour in discussion has been rational). Yet these benefits and
harms are not insignificant for those who value reasonable discussion. Therefore, these
rules (or variants of these rules) can make the use of the instrument of reasonable
discussion for resolving differences of opinion more attractive for potential discussants,
who, if no such victories were in sight, perhaps would refrain from discussing these
differences altogether.
Not all formal dialectic systems feature winning and losing, In Hamblin (1970)
these notions are absent. Consequently, Hamblin systems are not suitable as a basis for
definitions of validity by means of the concept of winning strategy. That is a pity for
logic, but does not impair the utility of Hamblin systems for the study of certain aspects
of argumentation.
4.3. Pragma-dialectics
Nowadays we have two versions of pragma-dialectics: the original standard version (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004) and the more recent extended or integrated
9
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version (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2002). 7 Let us first have a look at the
standard version. In critical discussion, which is the normative model of pragmadialectics, the primary goal is to achieve a resolution of the difference of opinion. A
resolution is not achieved by getting a simple agreement of opinions, let alone by striking
a deal, or agreeing to disagree on certain points:
A difference of opinion is only resolved if a joint conclusion is reached on the acceptability of the
standpoints at issue on the basis of a regulated and unimpaired exchange of arguments and
criticism. (van Eemeren en Grootendorst 2004, p. 58)

Just as in formal dialectic, there are two parties or roles: Protagonist and Antagonist.
These have each their specific task––the Protagonist as defender of a standpoint, the
Antagonist as a critic––, but also a common task: the resolution of the difference of
opinion. Just as little as this is the case for Aristotle’s dialectic, does this focus on a
common task exclude that there is also a role to play for competition and for winning and
losing. It may be the case that pragma-dialecticians do not speak of winning and losing,
but they do speak of a difference having “been resolved in favor of the protagonist”
(when the outcome is that the standpoint is acceptable and the Antagonist has to
withdraw his doubt) or “in favor of the antagonist” (when the outcome is that the
standpoint of the Protagonist must be withdrawn) (van Eemeren en Grootendorst 2004, p.
61-62). Actually, the notion of a resolution of a difference of opinion in someone’s favor
amounts to the same as what formal dialecticians mean by winning a discussion. In both
cases, what is involved is a benefit awarded according to the rules, without excluding that
someone who has to withdraw his standpoint or his doubt (because he loses) may in some
way or other also obtain a benefit.
The extended version even more stresses the notion that a resolution of a
difference of opinion can be in someone’s favour. In fact, this version of the theory
explicitly takes into account the consequences of the fact that each participant desires to
have a resolution in his favour, that is to say: to win the discussion. It is this desire, in
combination with the willingness to abide—in principle—by the rules of discussion, that
leads to strategic manoeuvring. Winning and losing are therefore central notions of the
extended theory
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I tried to get some hold on the use and the significance of the notions of
winning and losing, both in argumentative practice and in the theory of argumentation. It
was found that it is important to distinguish two senses of ‘winning’ (and of its opposite
‘losing’): the victory sense and the benefit sense. Using this distinction, it turned out to be
possible to defuse the apparent incompatibility between a win-win situation and a winloss situation.
As to the practice of argumentation, the use of ‘winning’ when referring to
debates was found to be rather slippery. To fathom the meaning of ‘winning’ one has to
observe carefully on what survey or jury report the use of the term was based, and how
7
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strategic maneuvering to realize both dialectical and rhetorical goals.
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this survey or report came into being. The usage of the term ‘winning’ in connection with
discussions may be unobjectionable (see Automatic Rock), but one should realize that
often people are indisposed to accept such usage, so that it might be advisable to look for
other terms.
As to the theory of argumentation, I would say that the use of ‘winning’ is
unproblematic. The term is not so martial that it implies the “Argument is war”-metaphor
(Cohen 1995); rather, one would think of a contest or a game. That only one of the parties
can win in the victory sense of ‘winning’ does, also where theory is concerned, not
exclude that both parties may win in the benefit sense. The term can, therefore, equally be
applied to those types of discussion that are cooperation-oriented. 8 A necessary condition
would be that, for each use, it be precisely stipulated what ‘winning’ amounts to.
An advantage of having opportunities for winning (as well as other contentious
aspects) in normative models of discussion would be that this enhances the attractiveness
of using discussion instead of other kinds of struggle. If one omits every reference to
struggle or competition from the model, then someone who wants to defend some point
of view will not easily be enticed to use that model as a guideline for discussion.
Another advantage was mentioned above in the quotation from Wlodarczyk:
[…] assuming the dialecticians pursue the common task, the desire to win could be seen as a
stimulus for pursuing it better than the opponent and hence for achieving the best argument for a
given conclusion. (Wlodarczyk 2000, p. 170, Noot 41)

Link to commentary
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